Systems based on the detection of Compton backscattered X-rays have been deployed for screening personnel for weapons and explosives. Similar principles are used for screening vehicles at border crossing points. Calculations based on well established scattering cross sections and absorption coefficients show that the dose from the personnel screening system is between 0.4 µSv and 9 µSv, depending on image quality.
INTRODUCTION
Since the September 2001 terrorist attacks, there has been considerable interest in the development and deployment of personnel screening systems that will detect explosives and other contraband as well as metal objects. With over 650 million airline passengers per year in the US, screening technology must be fast and accurate (Bureau of Transportation Statistics 2008) . Systems based on millimeter wave scattering and large angle Compton scattering are being used at airports and other facilities, such as prisons and detention centers, around the world. In X-ray scanning, a passenger is scanned by moving an X-ray beam rapidly over the body. The signal strength of detected backscattered X-ray allows a highly realistic surface image to be reconstructed. Screening is rapid and image resolution of the technology is high.
The deployment of X-ray screening units in major airports around the country has raised concerns about radiation doses to passengers. X-ray screening manufacturers claim that the radiation dose per scan is less than 0.1 µSv. This is substantially less than the average dose of 6.2 mSv that members of the US population get every year from all sources of radiation exposure, and is less than the increased cosmic radiation dose passengers receive during commercial airline travel (National Council on Radiation
Protection and Measurements 2009). In 2002 the American National Standards Institute
(ANSI) set a standard of 0.1 μSv per scan for an individual (American National Standards Institute 2002). The current ANSI standard is under revision. ANSI proposes to relax the dose limit from 0.1 to 0.25 µSv per "screening" and applies to "general use" systems. The reason for changing from a per-scan limit to a per-screening limit is to be fair to transmission systems that require only one scan vs. multiple scans. (Cerra 2009 ). The revised standard will be referred to throughout this paper instead of the current standard. Adoption of the revised standard is likely in 2009. American Science and Engineering (AS&E), the manufacturer of the SmartCheck system (SmartCheck personnel inspection system, American Science and Engineering, Inc., 829
Middlesex Turnpike, Billerica, MA 01821) and Rapiscan Systems Ltd., the manufacturer of the Rapiscan Secure 1000 (Rapiscan Secure 1000 people screening system, Rapiscan Systems Ltd., Bonehurst Road, Salfords, Redhill, Surrey, England, UK RH1 5GG) both claim they are in compliance with this standard. AS&E also make a vehicle screening system, the Z Portal (Z Portal multiview vehicle and cargo screening system, American Science and Engineering, Inc., 829 Middlesex Turnpike, Billerica, MA 01821) based on the same principles.
Although vendor-determined doses are small and not associated with adverse health effects dose accuracy is in question because of inherent difficulties in measuring X-ray exposures from rapidly moving X-ray beams. In this paper we use the theory of image formation and well established scattering cross sections and absorption coefficients to estimate the dose. Calculations presented here suggest the dose per scan is higher than vendor estimates. However, the increased dose to individual passengers remains well below doses that are known to cause adverse health effects.
DOSE ESTIMATION
The outlines of a Compton backscatter screening system for personnel were given in the patent application of Smith (Smith 1998) . The essential features of the system are shown as Fig. 1 . Fig.1 . Schematic diagram of personnel screening system. An X-ray tube with a collimator is used to generate a fan beam of X-rays, and a chopper wheel further restricts the X-rays to a pencil beam that scans in the vertical plane. Smith proposed using a 50 kV X-ray source, much lower in energy than the 100-120 kV X-ray source used in the AS&E personnel system or the source emitting 200 kV X-rays used in the vehicle scanning system. The detectors that he proposed are also probably smaller, and less efficient, than those used in the commercially available systems. The dose can be estimated from the image quality and the number of X-ray that would be generated from commercially available X-ray sources. The quality of the image sets limits on the number of X-rays detected for each pixel and the Compton scattering cross section can be used to estimate the number of incident X-rays per pixel.
The dose can then be calculated from mass absorption coefficients. As Smith (Smith 1998 ) stated in his patent application the pixel size is critical. From features shown in published images in a report on the AS&E Bodycheck system (Baukus 2000) , it would appear that the pixel size is 2mm (features on the gun and the zipper set these limits). The 2mm pixel size also is consistent with 1000 pixels in 2m, or 500 in 1m which would be appropriate for computer display of an individual. In one image it would appear that the pixel size is 1mm from features on a gun and the wire frame of glasses (Baukus 2000) . 
where r 2 is the point on the surface of the person on the line connecting r' to r and r 1 is the point on the surface of the person connecting r 0 on the X-ray source to r, as shown in Instead the maximum volume that could contribute to the signal will be estimated.
Neglecting the curvature of the person being scanned, equation 1 becomes
where z is a distance beneath the surface. To further simplify this expression the integration over the paths to the detector will be replaced by an effective solid angle, ΔΩ.
Equation 2 now becomes
The absorption coefficients are about 0.15-0.2 cm 2 /gm giving an effective absorption depth of 5-6 cm. which means that the integration through the body can be taken to infinity. As a last approximation the cosine factors will be set equal to 1 and the resulting integration gives
Note that this approximation leads to a higher estimation for the detected signal and therefore a lower estimate for the incident fluence. This means that the dose estimates given below might be a factor of 2 -3 too low.
Rearranging eqn 4 to get I 0 , we have
The Compton scattering cross sections can be calculated from the Klein Nishina formula (Heitler 1954, Johns and Cunningham 1983) and as shown in Fig. 2 the differential cross section becomes more forward peaked as the energy increases. The cross section for backscattering decreases as the energy is increased. From the footprint of both Rapiscan Secure 1000 and SmartCheck it would appear that the scattering angle is 135 o . This angle is not critical since the cross section varies slowly in this region. The SmartCheck system uses 100-120 kV x-ray generators with a tungsten target. (Callerame 2006 (Callerame , 2008 . From a calculated X-ray spectrum the average X-ray energy is 80 kV and the differential cross section for Compton scattering is 3.85x10 -26 cm 2 . The Z-portal system uses a higher energy X-ray generator with a voltage greater than 200 kV. The average X-ray energy can be estimated from the image of the driver sitting in a truck with the window down. The image intensity of the arm is attenuated by a factor of 33% by transmission through the door and window. Using X-ray absorption coefficients from XCOM (Berger et al. 2005) and assuming the door is 1mm steel and the glass is 6mm thick the average energy for the incident X-rays is 200 kV. The differential cross section for Compton scattering relevant for the vehicle scanning system is 2.52 x10 -26 cm 2 .
In the original patent filing of Smith (1998) it would appear that scintillators with an area of about 1 m 2 were placed above and below the person being scanned. The footprint of the Rapiscan Secure 1000 and the SmartCheck systems would suggest that the scintillators were of similar area at the side of the person. In either case a reasonable estimate for the solid angle would be 0.5 sr.
Since an 8 bit A/D converter was used and their signal processing algorithms require accurate intensity histograms, it is reasonable to assume that their images really do need 256 grey levels. To discriminate 256 levels requires 64000 counts ( N uncertainty, 1 σ). This assumes single-photon counting with a detection quantum efficiency (DQE) of 1, which is possible for higher X-ray energies, using a scintillator PM tube detector. Alternatively the number of counts could be estimated from the fluctuations in a constant area in the published images. In a region of high intensity the fluctuation in intensity is about 5 units on 200 units. This would imply 40 intensity levels, requiring 1600 counts for a perfect detection system. In reality the DQE would be closer to 0.5 (even this is optimistic) and about 3200 counts would be required.
The energy of the Compton scattered X-ray, E f , is lower than the incident energy, E i and is given by
The absorption coefficient is therefore higher. Absorption coefficients from XCOM (Berger et al. 2005) for 80 kV incident X-ray and 200 kV incident X-ray are given in Table 1 The dose is defined as the energy deposited per unit mass. The mass is given by the matter in the pixel
where ρ is the density and Δx is the pixel size 
assuming the attenuation of the X-ray flux is small in mass thickness ρt.
The dose is critically dependent on the product of energy absorption coefficient
and energy absorbed ΔE abs . Table 3 shows how they vary with x-ray energy for muscle. The minimum dose is expected where the product is a minimum at about 60 kV.
Not surprisingly this is the window used for radiology; it also has significant contrast from photo-absorption. At higher energies the lower absorption is compensated by the higher energy absorbed; at lower energies the higher absorption means that the energy is deposited in a smaller mass.
Using equation 8 the dose can be calculated for the personnel screening and the vehicle portal and is summarized in Table 4 . Since anterior and posterior views are taken for the personal screening systems the calculated dose per view has to be multiplied by 2 for a complete screening. For the vehicle scanning system, three views are taken so the dose is multiplied by 3 for a complete screening.
Personnel Screening (120 kVp) Vehicle Portal (>200 kVp) 3200 peak X-rays /pixel 0.4 μSv 0.03 μSv 64000 peak X-rays /pixel 9.0 μSv 0.6 μSv Table 4 . Dose for personnel screening and vehicle portal systems for different peak scattered X-rays
As can be seen from equations 5 and 8 the dose is very sensitive to the peak number of scattered photons needed for adequate contrast and the pixel size. Due to the large pixel size in the vehicle Z Portal system, a consequence of the large source-target distance, the vehicle Z Portal system gives doses below the revised ANSI standard of 0.25 µSv at 3200 peak X-rays per pixel but exceeds the revised standard at 64000 peak X-rays per pixel.. The personnel screening systems, even under optimistic assumptions for detection efficiency, will exceed the revised ANSI standard at either 3200 or 64000 peak X-rays per pixel. . This is due mainly to the high concentration of radiation in a small area. It should also be remembered that because of the simplifications leading to equation 4 these estimates are lower bounds for the doses. Uncertainties in these estimates mainly come from the detector solid angle, but this can not be more than about + 30% since the detector is constrained by the lateral dimension of the system. The next largest source of uncertainty is the average scattering angle, but as can be seen from x-ray beams that scan the subject at high speed ("flying spot") is inherently difficult and unreliable due to partial volume irradiation and response times of any systems that do not use solid state detectors (Metzger 2009 ).
CONCLUSIONS
While the vehicle portal system is probably in compliance with the revised 0.25 μSv ANSI standard, it is very unlikely that the dose from any of the personnel screening systems is in compliance.
At 0.25 µSv per screening a total of 1000 scans would be necessary to reach the administrative dose limit of 0.25 mSv per year for a member of the general public (U.S.Nuclear Regulatory Commission 1991). Based on a calculated dose of 0.4 µSv for a low image quality scan and 9.0 µSv for a high quality image scan (Table 4) , 625 scans and 28 scans respectively would be necessary to reach the administrative public doses limit of 0.25 mSv per year. It is quite plausible that employees and frequent visitors of prisons and detention centers using the Rapiscan 1000 or SmartCheck systems could reach the administrative dose limit. 
